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Abstract
In this paper I show how reliable estimates of the Value of a Sta-
tistical Life (VSL) can be obtained using cross sectional data using
Garen’s instrumental variable (IV) approach. The increase in the
range confidence intervals due to the IV setup can be reduced by a
factor of 3 by using a proxy to risk attitude. In order state the “pre-
cision” of the cross sectional VSL estimates I estimate the VSL using
Chilean panel data and use them as benchmark for different cross sec-
tional specifications. The use of the proxy eliminates need for using
hard-to-find instruments for the job risk level and narrows the con-
fidence intervals for the workers in the Chilean labor market for the
year 2009.
1 Introduction
In the last years the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) has won an important
place as a tool for public policy decision and welfare measure (Jena et al,
2003)[8]. As consequence, there is an increasing concern on the reliability of
the VSL estimates due to the disparate results and the sometimes excessively
large confidence intervals found in the literature. Several methods have been
proposed to get reasonable and stable estimates, and the most successful
ones involve the use of panel data sets (Knieser et al, 2012)[10]. This arises
one important concern: can we still say anything about the VSL in absence
of panel data? This concern becomes particularly important in developing
economies, where there are neither VSL estimates or available panel data
sets.
By using data from the Chilean labor market I show how the VSL can be
accurately estimated from cross sectional data at a cost of a wide confidence
interval by using Garen’s (1988)[5] instrumental variable (IV) approach. I
also show that the range of this confidence interval can be reduced by a factor
of 3 by using a proxy to risk attitude. In order state the “precision” of the
cross sectional VSL estimates I use panel data estimates as benchmark.
The innovation respect to the previous literature is the use of a variable
that measures directly the willingness to take risks, which avoids the need
for the use of instruments and at the same time reduces the variance of the
estimates.
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2 Literature Review
In addition to the traditional econometric problems in the estimation of wage
equations (such as selection bias and omitted variables), the estimation of the
Value of a Statistical Life using the hedonic wages approach adds the issue
of the measurement error in the risk levels (fatal and non-fatal). Authors
have tried to account for this issue, especially when it is correlated with the
covariates in the wage equations (Black and Kniesner, 2003)[3], when the
safety risks levels are difficult to quantify (Ashenfelter, 2006)[2] or when the
non fatal measure is not as accurate as the fatal measurement (Siebert and
Wei, 1994)[13].
Even if we have a good measurement of the risk level, usually they are
presented in an aggregate fashion, most of the time grouped by economic
industry group. If the aggregation is done in j sectors, then the risk mea-
surement variable will take only j possible values. This implies that we will
end up with zero heterogeneity between groups and that the estimates will
have low explanatory power. Additional to this, we expect that in most of
the cases the individuals will supply their work hours according to the per-
ceived risk and not the actual risk level, which may be unknown. Viscusi
(1979)[16] proposes that perceived risk is correlated with the effective risk
rates, but usually researchers cannot test that hypothesis because very de-
tailed data is necessary in order to have reliable estimators. Timmins and
Murdock (2007)[15] propose a method to alleviate such need for detail using
data from other firms in the same economic sector as instruments for risk
level perception. In this case, the risk level measure will be a good covari-
ate for estimating the labor demand function but not for the labor supply
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function.
Another concern when the wage-risk trade-off is estimated is the self-
selection problem. It arises in two ways: First, workers with low risk aver-
sion will choose risky jobs not necessarily because of the higher wage, but
for the utility they obtain from risk, which implies that wages and risk lev-
els are simultaneously determined (Garen, 1988)[5]. Second, the omission
of unobserved productivity lowers the VSL estimates. According to Hwang
et al. (1992)[6], the addition of productivity proxies to the estimation of
wage equations tends to increase the estimators of the VSL up to ten times,
whereas Garen (1988)[5] suggested that “coolheadness” should explain dif-
ferences in productivity: a cool-headed worker may be more productive that
the average worker in a risky job, but non different than the average worker
in a safe work.
The best solution the self selection problem is the use of panel data to
difference out any unobservable ability correlated with occupation selection
and risk preferences (Knieser et all, 2012)[10]. Unfortunately panel data is
not allways available. A feasible solution using cross sectional data is the use
of an appropriate instrumental variable (Reiersol, 1941)[14], however there
is wide consensus in the difficulty to find one. Also, uncomfortably wide
confidence intervals are obtained using weak instruments (Kochi, 2007)[9].
The most of the studies have concentrated in to obtain VSL estimates for
developed countries. Since there are differences in the VSL estimates among
developed and underdeveloped countries and am using data from one of the
last, I will provide a brief discussion of the differences in the section 3.
3
3 VSL Variations Between Countries
Among the few studies with results for developed countries, Miller (2000)[11]
is perhaps the most comprehensive. Miller analyzes 68 studies and extrapo-
late the results to 49 countries using the Gross Domestic Product as predictor.
Even though the indirectly obtained values cannot be directly compared with
those estimated using hedonic wages, they provide some insights about how
the relative magnitudes of the estimates should be among countries.
As one can expect, the estimates for developed countries are higher than
the estimates for developing and underdeveloped ones and some explanations
can be provided. First, the labor markets in underdeveloped countries are not
properly developed, and then the market wages do not incorporate properly
the risk levels, yielding small risk premiums. Second, safety standards are less
restrictive in those countries, allowing the employers to provide low quality
safety equipment and facilities. This problem is worse in the absence of a
job contract, in which case the employer is not responsible for providing any
safety measures and workers must accept a lower wage to face a reduction in
the work risk. Finally, the results for underdeveloped countries usually are
expressed in U.S. dollars, but not corrected by parity of purchasing power.
Whichever the cause, the difference is notorious if we compare the results
reported by Miller (2000)[11] for North America and European Union of
2.3 to 5 million dollars of 2009 with the estimates for Chile that ranges
form 0.8 to 1.3 million dollars. However, since Miller’s results are based in
extrapolations of VSL from developed countries based on GDP, the results
are not comparable and the estimates for underdeveloped countries are lower
just because they have lower GDP per capita. The only VSL result obtained
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from labor market data for estimate for Chile is about 4.6 million dollars
(Parada et al, 2012)[12].
4 Econometric Framework
For the panel estimates I used the following hedonic log-wage equation:
lnwijt = αi + α1pijt +Xitβ + uijt , (1)
where lnwijt is the log of the monthly wage of worker i (i = 1, . . . , N), in the
industry j (j = 1, . . . , J), at time t (t = 1, . . . , T ), αi is an individual constant
term, pijt is the industry specific risk rate, Xit are demographics controls:
education, age, age squared, monthly hours worked and dummies for public
sector, union status and contract status. uijt is a normally distributed iid
error term. I tried different specifications using time controls also, but they
were not significant.
The cross sectional estimates are the one-period version of the log-wage
equation. From equation (1) we estimate the VSL by using the formula
V̂ SL =
[(
∂wˆ
∂pi
= αˆ1 × w
)
× h× 10, 000
]
, (2)
were h are the annual hours of work, w is the average wage (Note that the
fatal risk is per 10,000 worker.)
5 Data
I have used two sources of information: the Chilean Safety Association Yearly
Reports, which are the only public statistics about workplace fatal and non
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fatal accidents, and the Chilean Social Protection Survey, waves 2004, 2006
and 2009, which is a rich data set of approximately 20,000 Chilean people
in the labor market. It contains information about labor history, retirement
funds, education, health, training, assets and household composition. The
survey is modular: individual, labor history and household information is
presented in separated hierarchical data files. In order to have comparable
estimates I used male and female over 19 years old that worked for salary
pay in the year of the survey, non permanently disabled and without missing
values on the covariates1.
The description of the workplace fatal risks by industry group and year
are presented in table 1. As shown in the table, the aggregation of the
information is by one digit SIC, so the variable risk is constant over groups.
The descriptive statistics of all the variables for the econometric exercise
are presented in table 2 for the wave of 2009.
The common variables for the Mincer’s specification are presented along
with a dummy for the existence of job contract. This is an important variable
usually not presented in studies for developed countries, but that makes a big
difference in underdeveloped ones as explained in section 3. The instruments
for risk are marital status, spouse years of schooling, dummies for spouse
illness and job and the number of children under 6 years old. The variable
willingness to take risks is the used proxy for risk preferences and consists of a
likert-type variable ranging from 0 to 10, 0 being the lesser willingness to take
risks. Under the assumption that risk preferences do affect job choice and
1Perhaps for comparison with the bulk of results for developed economies it would
be better to estimate only for male workers, but the fatality risk variable includes both
genders, so separation is inappropriate. Also, the unique VSL for Chile includes both male
and female, so I did not restrict the sample.
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wages, the inclusion this variable will capture the individual heterogeneity
eliminating the need for an instrument.
6 Results
The benchmark estimates for the equation 2 are presented in table 3. As ex-
pected, I get different results from the different panel specifications, ranging
between 1.4 and 7.4 million dollars. The pooled OLS and the fixed estima-
tors are in general expected to be either downwards or upward bias due to
unobservable heterogeneity. If the unobserved variables that capture hetero-
geneity are time invariant, then the within estimator or the first difference
estimator should be the most appropriated. The point estimators for this
two models are similar, but the first differences estimator is not significant.
This is not surprising in presence of small unbalanced panel. The minimum
requirement for identification of a balanced model is two sample periods and
in this case there are just three. As pointed by Jimenez-Martin (1988)[7],
unbalanced panel exhibit worse testing performance than balanced one for
a fixed number of individuals. If the unobserved variables are not time in-
variant, then the random effects will be more appropriated. Note that both
random effects estimators are significant and lies between the lowest and
highest estimates, so am using them as benchmark. Although the random
effects model assumes that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with
the covariates in the model, which may not be true, it still reduce the VSL
compared with those who are not controlling for it (Knieser et al, 2012)[10].
Assuming that the “right” estimate for the VSL is around 3.4 and 3.9
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million dollars, the next step is to investigate if similar results can be obtained
from cross sectional data.
There results of the estimation of the cross sectional version of the equa-
tion 2 are presented in the table 4. In the first column I show the base
estimates for the log-wage equation using the simple linear approach. The
right hand side variables are a constant, years of schooling, age, age squared,
worked hours, three dummies for public sector workers, contract and union
membership and the fatal risk. The estimated VSL is us$715,036 with a
range of the 95% confidence interval of us$133,159. This estimate is ex-
pected to biased because is not correcting for unobserved heterogeneity and
it is outside the confidence intervals of the benchmark estimates. The effect
of the bias is undetermined and depends on how the unobserved variables
are correlated with the wage and fatality rates.
The result of the use of the IV estimation using Garen’s (1988) approach
is presented in the column (2). This specification has the same covariates
as those in column (1), but the risk is instrumented using marital status,
number children under 6 years old, schooling of the spouse and dummies for
illness of the spouse and work of the spouse. As expected, the estimate VSL
increased to us$3,654,338, but at a cost of an increase in the range of the 95%
confidence interval, which is now us$819,741. In spite of the increase in the
confidence interval, this estimate is more apropriate than that obtained in the
first setup because it is controlling for risk preferences and it is statistically
not different from the benchmark estimates and has lower variance. This is
mild evidence in favor of the goodness of the instruments.
Overall, the instruments are good predictors of risk and satisfy the exclu-
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sion condition under the Anderson-Rubin (1949)[1] test setup, but they do
not under the Fractionally Resampled Anderson-Rubin setup (Berkowitz et
al, 2012)[4], so one or some of them may be weak.
The final specification is presented in the column (3). This estimation
include the same covariates than in the column (1) and adds the proxy for
the risk preferences. The estimate for the fatal risk coefficient is not statis-
tically different from that obtained from the IV estimation, but its standard
error is smaller. This allow a good reduction in the width of the 95% confi-
dence interval to us$265,153. This is only a third of the range estimated by
using the IV approach and is evidence supporting the distortion of the use
of inappropriate instruments (Kochi, 2007)[9].
To put this estimates in context, they are statistically lower than the
reported by Knieser et al. (2012)[10], which ranges the VSL for USA between
5 to 12 million dollars and also inferior to the ones reported by Parada et
al (2012)[12] for Chile, but since there is not an interval for the last ones,
equality cannot be either accepted or rejected.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that it is still possible to get reliable VSL estimates
from cross sectional data. This is crucial in developing economies, where
the available data is scarce or non-existent and the cost of a panel-type
surveying process is sometimes too high. In such cases, dimension reductions
are very welcome as ways to reduce surveying costs and increase the quality
of statistical inference by using better covariates. I also provided evidence
9
that the instruments proposed by Garen (1988)[5] may be weak and better
instrument are required to use this approach.
This results provides evidence that that the use of a variable that directly
measure the attitude toward risks can eliminate the need of the use of in-
struments to correct for risk and wage endogeneity and reduce the range of
the VSL confidence intervals.
It is important to note that this approach is not eliminating the mea-
surement error in the job risk variable and it is not controlling for latent
heterogeneity in productivity, but still provides a good way to increase the
accuracy of the VSL estimates. One concern is that the proxy for risk may
not be capturing the attitude towards labor risk. The question How willing
are you to take risks? is too broad, and people can be thinking different
risk sources when answering (like financial risks or risky outdoors activities.)
This arises a measurement error problem for the proxy, and the parameters
may be biased toward zero, but since the point estimates under the IV and
under the linear setup are the same, there is no evidence that the bias is
important.
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8 Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Fatal Risk by Industry Group.
Group 2009 2006 2004
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 19.6 11.4 14.2
Mining 22.0 37.2 8.8
Manufacturing 6.4 8.2 10.4
Electricity, Gas and Water 34.2 0.0 253.4
Construction 22.6 25.3 23.0
Trade 5.2 9.1 2.1
Transportation, Storage & Communication 29.1 35.4 23.3
Services 7.0 7.9 3.6
Weighted Average 2.1 1.4 1.5
Number of observations 4,953 5,951 6,047
a: Fatal risk in 1/10,000 ratio.
Source: Chilean Safety Association.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables.
Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly wagea 2.144 26,802 573.73 872.055
Log Wage 0.763 10.196 6.01 0.783
Monthly hours worked 2 126 44.91 13.160
Years of schooling 0 25 10.74 4.202
Age 19 84 44.55 11.376
Age Squared 361 7,056 2,114 1,064
Gender 0 1 0.60 0.490
Public sector worker 0 1 0.13 0.336
Have a contract 0 1 0.67 0.47
Union affiliation 0 1 0.17 0.38
Instruments for Risk
Marital Status 0 1 0.63 0.482
Spouses’s Schooling 0 24 5.89 5.755
Spouses’s Illness 0 1 0.58 0.493
Spouses Works 0 1 0.29 0.453
Children under 6 0 2 0.13 0.355
Risk Measures
Fatal Risk (1/10,000) 2.635 28.891 8.848 8.390
Willingness to take risks 0 10 5.6 3.1
Number of observations 6,059
a: Expressed in US dollars of 2009.
Source: Social Protection Survey 2009, Chile.
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Table 3: Panel Estimates of the Wage-Fatal Risk Trade-off.
Pooled OLS Between Within First Random Random
Estimator Estimator Estimator Difference Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) GLS (5) MLE (6)
Risk Coefficient × 1000 2.6918 3.9378 0.7485 0.8092 1.8284 2.0791
(0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0005)
V̂ SL (millions) 5.1 7.4 1.4 1.5 3.4 3.9
95% Confidence Interval [3.4—6.8] [3.8 — 11.0] [0.2 — 2.6] [-2.6—5.6] [2.0—4.9] [2.0—5.7]
Variation Range 1.7 3.6 1.2 4.1 1.4 1.8
Number of Observations 13,387 6,913 13,387 6,577 13,387 31,387
Dependent variable in all estimations is log wage. All the models controls for education, age, age squared, hours of work and
dummies for public sector workers, contract existence, union affiliation and time. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Estimates of the Wage-Fatal Risk Trade-off, year 2009.
Linear Wage IV Estimation Linear Wage
Equation (1) (2) Equation (3)
Risk Coefficient × 10 1.0386 5.3078 5.4602
(0.0010) (0.0058) (0.0020)
V̂ SL 715,036 3,654,338 3,759,271
95% Confidence Interval [580,204 — 849,869] [2,865,950 — 4,442,726] [3,494,118 — 4,024,424]
Variation Range 134,833 788,388 265,153
Number of Observations 6,059
Dependent variable in all estimations is log wage. All models controls for education, age, age squared, hours of work and
dummies for public sector workers, contract presence and union affiliation. Model (2) instrumentalize the fatal risk using
marital status, number children under 6 years old, schooling of the spouse and dummies for illness of the spouse and
work of the spouse as suggested in Garen (1988). Model (3) uses willingness to take risk as proxy for risk preferences.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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